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ABSTRACT
In the most recent issue of JBE (vol.31996:32-43), Charles Hallisey calls
into question what he sees as a pernicious assumption at work in the
study of Theravàda ethics.  The problem, according to Hallisey, is that
many scholars who study Theravàda ethics assume that the Theravàda
tradition has only a single moral theory, and they therefore try to reduce
the plurality of the tradition to fit their single-theory view. Hallisey rec-
ommends that scholars see the Theravàda ethical tradition as an instance
of ethical particularism, a position he describes both as pluralistically
including many theories and as having no theory at all.  For this reason,
Hallisey recommends that scholars abandon the abstract search for the
nature of Buddhist ethics in general. After clarifying HalliseyÕs recom-
mendation, I argue that it is wrong. Although the Theravàda tradition,
like any religious tradition, includes more than one ethical theory, there
is no good reason not to inquire into its general or formal features. With
Russell Sizemore, I recommend an inclusive understanding of compara-
tive religious ethics that sees a place for both for the historical study of
the particular and the philosophical study of the general.
In Ethical Particularism in Theravàda Buddhism, Charles Halliseycalls into question what he sees as a pernicious assumption at workin the study of Theravàda ethics.1   The problem, according to
Hallisey, is the assumption that Theravàda ethics has only a single moral
theory.  Instead, he says, I think we should ask whether it is possible
that Buddhists approached their ethical concerns without any theory at
all, but instead adopted a kind of ethical particularism.Ó2   I find this
proposal ambiguous, for it can be interpreted as saying that Buddhism
has no ethical theory, or that it has one, namely ethical particularism.
Moreover, Hallisey wants to argue from this observation of particularism
or pluralism to the recommendation that scholars of Buddhist ethics
should abandon the quest for the nature of Buddhist ethics in general.
This recommendation seems to me wrong-headed, and a step backward
from better understandings of the task of comparative religious ethics.
Hallisey makes two moves which seem to me extremely promis-
ing for the future study of Theravàda ethics.  First, he rejects the claim
that Theravàda tradition is monolithic.  As a historical phenomenon,
the Theravàda Buddhist tradition ... has been internally diverse... its prac-
titioners and intellectuals have resorted to more than one kind of moral
theory.Ó3   This call for the recognition of the pluralism of a religious
tradition is certainly sound.  The insistence that a religious tradition that
spans more than a dozen countries and languages over 2500 years of
history is pluralist is so commonsensical, in fact, that it is difficult to
imagine that scholars of Buddhism have denied it.  As Hallisey says, It
is very easy to provide numerous examples from different times and
places which demonstrate that Theravàda Buddhists did not have only
one moral theory.Ó4   HalliseyÕs bigger game is the quest for some unity
behind the pluralism.  That is, he wants to argue that the pluralism of the
Theravàda tradition rules out the quest for a moral theory underlying or
structuring Buddhist ethics, one which, once identified, would provide a
global justification for the specific parts of Buddhist ethics.Ó5   As an
example of this mistake, he quotes Damien KeownÕs The Nature of Bud-
dhist Ethics: ÒWe see the same expectation in methodological calls for
us to move beyond simple descriptions of Buddhist morality to Òsuch
matters as the logic or mode of moral reasoning found in particular sources
and the overall pattern of justification exhibited by movements, schools,
sects, or even collections of texts, which may be designated as ethical
systems or subsystemsÕ.Ó6    I will argue that although Hallisey is right to
recognize the plurality, it does not follow that one should abandon the
inquiry into the overall pattern of justification in a tradition.
A second promising move in HalliseyÕs proposal is to turn atten-
tion to writings outside the Pali canon, and especially to stories.7   He
points out that the ethical message of the stories is often overdetermined.
In these narratives, the modes of moral reasoning are not only plural and
divergent, they conflict with each other and therefore cannot be taken in
a single way.  Hallisey gives as an example the story of Siri Sanga Bo, a
story which can be interpreted as based on consequentialist, deontological,
or virtue ethics reasoning.8   As with the observation of pluralism, he
wants to argue that this overdetermined character of stories, a mirror of
what we find in the tradition as a whole,Ó9  rules out the reasonability of
general statements about the nature of Buddhist ethics.  HalliseyÕs point
is that the multivalence of the narratives implies the inappropriateness
of the quest for the nature of Buddhist ethics in general.  Instead, [s]tories
like that of Siri Sanga Bo are discursive sites where Buddhists debated
the scope and validity of the different ethical theories which they knew,
and when we see these stories as such, we realize that there can be no
answer to a question that asks us to discover which family of ethical
theory underlies Buddhist ethics in general simply because Buddhists
availed themselves of and argued over a variety of moral theories.Ó10
I applaud this turn away from monolithicity and the canon, but
what is the best way to understand this pluralism and indeterminateness
of meaning?  Hallisey says that we need a way to theorize about
Theravàda ethics in such a way that takes this pluralism seriously, a
way ... which allows us to see the ethical diversity in the Theravàda as
more than a historical accident.Ó11   Hence his recommendation: I think
we should ask whether it is possible that Buddhists approached their
ethical concerns without any theory at all, but instead adopted a kind of
ethical particularism.Ó12
Does Hallisey mean that Theravàda Buddhism includes no theory
or that it includes just one?  Consider the two options.  The claim that
Buddhists have no theory at all is surely false.  This is a claim that is
contradicted both by the observation that the tradition is pluralist and by
HalliseyÕs claim that it includes ethical particularism.  There may be
some truth to the idea that Buddhists Òapproached their ethical concernsÓ
with no theory, in the psychological sense that people typically do not
act with an explicit ethical theory in mind, but this does not rule out
philosophical reflection on theory implicit in conduct.  So I think that
the most plausible way to understand HalliseyÕs claim that the Theravàda
have no theory is as saying that they have no one theory.
Now consider the claim that Theravàda Buddhists adopted a kind
of ethical particularism.  By ethical particularism, Hallisey means that
the Buddhist ethical tradition recognized that there are a variety of moral
goods, that these may be inconsistent with each other, and that they can-
not be derived from some method.  He wants to say that Buddhist ethics,
like W. D. Ross, rejects the idea that Òsome moral principles are more
important than others; it also eschews any attempt to discover any con-
sistency in the things which we take to matter morally.Ó13   Buddhist
ethics is not interested in questions about the nature of the good in gen-
eral.
Hallisey supports this claim by pointing to BuddhaghosaÕs com-
mentary on the Maïgalasutta.14   In this commentary, Buddhaghosa tells
a story in order to answer the question: what is auspiciousness?  The
first person to answer, one of those ... not content to say that auspicious
things are those which are conducive to well-being,15 says that auspi-
cious things are those myriad things that are pleasing to the eye: dressed
up children, a chariot drawn by a thoroughbred horse, a pregnant woman,
etc.  But this is not convincing to those who say that auspicious things
are identified through the other senses, and they begin to argue.  The
argument eventually reaches the gods who decline to give an opinion,
saying Why should we try to weigh something by hand when scales are
right here? and go to ask the Buddha.  The Buddha gives this answer:
Something is called auspicious when it is a cause for welfare in this
world or the next, and then gives a list of thirty-eight examples.16
Hallisey reads this story as the rejection of methodism and the endorse-
ment of particularism, for he says that the person who says that auspi-
cious things are those that are visible tries but fails to provide a criterion
of auspiciousness, while the Buddha simply gives a list of thirty-eight
auspicious things.
Another readingand to my eyes, a more natural oneis the op-
posite.  The first person to answer, the one who identifies auspicious-
ness with what is pleasing to the eye, has a false criterion of auspicious-
ness, one which makes clear only his own bungling desires.17  The
Buddha, by contrast, has the true criterion, worldly and transcendent
benefits.  Thus those who base their understanding of auspiciousness
on the senses end up with a mere list of things, but the Buddha provides
a single criterion (though one which will necessarily be applied in dif-
ferent ways for monks and laity).
It is worthwhile to see here that HalliseyÕs particularist, anti-theo-
retical approach informs and shapes his reading of the text no less than a
generalist, theoretical approach does for other scholars.  No matter where
one stands, one must make decisions about oneÕs interpretive categories
and their implications.  It would be interesting to see which interpreta-
tion of this text, the particularist or the Òmethodist,Ó is more in accord
with the perspective of the Maïgalasutta or with other commentaries on
it.  The proper interpretation of this commentary, however, is not cru-
cial.  The question is not whether this particular text endorses an anti-
theoretical account of moral goods; it may.  The question is whether
particularism is the best approach to Buddhist ethics in general, and this
is problematic.
Certainly, if Buddhist ethics are really particularist, then Hallisey
is right that there will be no theory that makes sense of various Buddhist
goods.  The problem is that to say that Buddhist ethics are particularist
sounds like a monolithic statement about Buddhist ethics.  One would
disprove this claim in exactly the same way Hallisey disproves any ar-
gument about the nature of Buddhist ethics, viz., by counter-examples,
and as he pointed out [i]t is very easy to provide numerous examples
from different times and places which demonstrate that Theravàda Bud-
dhists did not have only one moral theory.Ó18   It is because the claim that
Buddhist ethics are really particularist is so vulnerable to HalliseyÕs own
criticisms that I suspect that he is confused.  It is not the case that
Theravàda ethics have no theory nor that they have only one, ethical
particularism.  Rather, it seems most plausible to stick with the
commonsense observation that Theravàda ethics involves several theo-
riesthat Theravàda ethics are pluralist.
As I understand it, then, the strongest support for HalliseyÕs rec-
ommendation that scholars should abandon the quest for statements about
the nature of Buddhist ethics in general amounts to the following:
Theravàda Buddhism, like other religious traditions, uses many differ-
ent modes of ethical reasoning (deontological, consequentialist, virtue-
based, particularist, and others).  The tradition is in fact so pluralist or
varied that attention to the particular will lead one to abandon the gen-
eral, or more precisely, the only general statement one can make is that
the tradition is pluralist.  Some texts are particularist, recognizing no
way to generalize about diverse goods, and this is analogous to the char-
acter of the tradition as a whole.
I now want to argue that this recommendation is wrong, and to
defend the legitimacy of general statements about the nature of Theravàda
ethics.
The first thing to note is that general statements about the nature
of Buddhist ethics are hypotheses.  They are not absolute or unchang-
ing.  A model of this kind of interpretation goes like this: person A says
Buddhists in general are X; person B says, you overlook this particular
text or aspect of a text which isnÕt X; person A then modifies the hy-
pothesis to account for the new data, and the back and forth goes on.
Philosophy is the critique of abstractions, as Whitehead says.19   A
hypothesis about the nature of Buddhist ethics is a conversation-starter,
in Richard RortyÕs words.  This is, in fact, what goes on in KeownÕs
book as he tries to move beyond not only descriptive work, but also
beyond the first round of generalizations.  Keown criticizes those inter-
pretations of Theravàda ethics based on what he calls the transcend-
ency thesis which tend to characterize Theravàda ethics as utilitarian
reasoning about the benefits of karma, and in its place recommends his
own interpretation in which Buddhist ethics are eudaimonistic in the
sense that they aim at human flourishing.  He is perfectly explicit that
his position is a hypothesis, open to further debate.
The second thing to note is that general statements are not essen-
tialist.  General statements about the nature of a religious tradition can
grant that there are other possible readings of an individual text, but
nevertheless argue that some interpretations are more central or deter-
minative for the tradition being studied than others.  In fact, it seems that
this process of looking for general or dominant themes of an ethical
tradition is more sensitive to the particularities of the tradition than one
which homogenizes every reading under the label of pluralism.  With-
out denying the pluralism or the multivalence, one could argue that the
best understanding of a given text is, say, consequentialist.  And contra
Hallisey, it seems that there is no reason one cannot repeat this process
with schools, movements, or with the tradition as a whole.
One should also note how many disagree with Hallisey here.  Op-
posing his position are not only those who argue that it makes sense to
ask what single family of theories best interprets Theravàda ethics, but
also those who agree that Buddhist ethics includes more than one theory,
but are not so pluralist that one cannot make general descriptions of
their reasoning.  This latter group includes those who argue that Theravàda
ethics fall into two forms of reasoning, a kammic and a nibbannic,20
three,21  or four.22   All of these people agree with Keown that it is fruitful
to try to make general statements about the logic or mode of moral rea-
soning found in particular sources and the overall pattern of justification
exhibited by movements, schools, sects, or even collections of texts,
which may be designated as ethical systems or subsystems.
 In short, the inquiry into the general nature of Buddhist ethics is
hypothetical, nonessentialist, and multiform.  In rejecting this kind of
investigation, Hallisey seems to be returning to and strengthening a di-
vide between historians and ethicists in comparative religious ethics that
has been widely bemoaned.
This divide, I believe, has been overcome for practical purposes
by Russell Sizemore.23  Sizemore observes that comparative religious
ethics as a field is divided into historians, typically specialists in some
non-Western religious tradition, and ethicists, typically trained in
Western philosophical ethics.  Sizemore argues that this split reflects
two different understandings of the purpose of comparative religious
ethics. For historians, the goal is to illuminate how a given tradition
has shaped its adherentsÕ conduct, in aspiration and historical embodi-
ment, or in other words to uncover the relationship between faith and
culture.24   For ethicists, the goal is to compare the forms of practical
reasoning employed by religious traditions, or in other words to illumi-
nate the relationship between faith and reason.25   Sizemore further ar-
gues that these different understandings of comparative religious ethics
reflect different epistemological orientations.  Historians tend to be em-
piricists, and they typically see the very idea of moral reasoning as a
cultural construct.  Ethicists tend to be formalists, and they typically see
moral reasoning as distinguishable from religious reasoning.  Sizemore
says that we can hardly expect scholars of religious ethics to solve an
epistemological problem, and so he recommends that we take an inclu-
sive understanding of the discipline to allow for both orientations.  In
this way, Òscholars can disagree over which approach within the field is
the most profitable without suggesting that those who take the opposing
view have failed to meet minimal standards of the discipline.  In the
final analysis each group will be judged on its ability to illuminate the
tradition under study and to show its bearings on matters of general im-
portance.Ó26
I think that this ÒsyntheticÓ and democraticÓ proposal is right,
but I suspect that it is also true.  That is, I believe that one can argue that
it is not only useful in the sense that it is good for the time being, until
the epistemological dispute is solved, but that it is also necessary.  The
necessity comes from the mutual implication of the two basic orientations.
The comparative study of religious ethics as a field will never not be
both historical and philosophical.
My argument is this.  The teaching of proper conduct (ethics in the
historiansÕ sense) will inevitably imply some form of moral reasoning,
some justification, since, as Geertz says, mere convention satisfies few
people in any culture.27   Likewise, the forms of moral reasoning (ethics
in the ethicistsÕ sense) will inevitably be reasoning about something spe-
cific and historically given, since, as Kant says, Òit is certainly undeni-
able that every volition must have an object and therefore a material.Ó28
The two sides cannot do without each other.  The particular content and
the general form of ethical judgments may be distinguishable, but they
are not separable.
If this is right, that philosophical inquiry depends on historical
inquiry and vice versa, then one may want to qualify SizemoreÕs de-
scription of comparative religious ethics as including two different epis-
temological orientations.  If by ÒdifferentÓ Sizemore means that history
and philosophy are merely different, and that one can simply choose
either orientation and avoid the other, then I am giving reasons to amend
this view.  On this view, any philosophical inquiry in comparative reli-
gious ethics will necessarily involve (at least implicitly) decisions about
the historical context of what is studied, and any historical inquiry will
necessarily involve (at least implicitly) decisions about philosophical
matters.  The radical separation of the philosophical and the historical,
or of the general and the particular, strikes me as a remnant of positiv-
ism that is no longer tenable.29
I hope it is clear, therefore, that by insisting on the legitimacy of
inquiry into the general or formal aspects of moral reasoning, I am not
claiming that one can understand Theravàda ethics solely by appeal to
formal thinking.  The object or the material pursued must be made intel-
ligible in the terms of the culture under study.  Inquiries into the formal
aspects of comparative religious ethics are therefore dependent upon
and wait upon the deliverances of those hermeneutic inquiries that iden-
tify what the claim and practices mean.  Nevertheless, no matter how
particularistic, contingent, or idiosyncratic its subject matter, moral rea-
soning always takes some form or another. For this reason, the study of
Theravàda ethics properly includes attention to these forms.
Jeffrey Stout uses the term ÒstereoscopicÓ to describe social criti-
cism that pays attention both to the goods internal to a practicethe
goods that can be realized only in the course of trying to achieve those
standards of excellence that define that practiceand goods external to
a practice, goods it may share with many others.30   Analogously, one
might speak of stereoscopic comparative religious ethics that aims for
moral accounts that pay attention both to the particular goods pursued in
a specific moral text or practice, and to the general forms that the justifi-
cations for the pursuits take.  A stereoscopic account of Theravàda moral
texts and practices would not emphasize particular contents over gen-
eral forms, or the vice versa.  This would be a comparative religious
ethics with both oneÕs historical and philosophical eyes open.
From this perspective, HalliseyÕs rejection of generalizing about
patterns of justification and his statement that Òthe study of Theravàda
Buddhism is best pursued historicallyÓ31  sound suspiciously like one-
sided preSizemore arguments.  That is, it is not merely that he person-
ally is more interested in the particular than the general, but that he feels
that the quest for a meta-theory of Theravàda ethics distorts it and ought
not be pursued. In this sense, he regards the historical approach as ob-
ligatory.
Hallisey wants to argue for pluralism, the central role of narrative,
and a broadening of the literature attended to.  This paper does not criti-
cize what he affirms, but what he wants to reject.  In my opinion, one
can accept these proposals concerning Theravàda ethics in particular
without rejecting the quest for the nature of Theravàda ethics in gen-
eral.32
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